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LEGISLATION
AIR CARRIERS-RECENT AMENDMENT TO CAB REGULATIONS
As of March 2, 1954, interstate and international air carriers are
no longer required to include notice of claim or time for suit
provisions' in the tariffs which they file with the Civil Aeronautics
Board. This change was effected by an addition to the Board's regu-
lations whereby "[n] o provision of the Board's Regulations... shall
be construed to require . . . the filing of any tariff rules stating any
limitation on, or condition relating to, the carrier's liability for per-
sonal injury or death .... , 2 As a result, the Board has clearly
indicated that should such "phantom" provisions be inserted in the
carrier's tariffs, they will be mere surplusage and hence not binding
upon passengers.3
The ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW, 4 in 1953, had pointed out that
the inclusion of such time provisions in its filed tariff enabled the
carrier to escape liability for its wrongs to the public. It was sug-
gested that the inclusion of such provisions in the carrier's tariff, with
its binding effect upon passengers, should not be condoned by the
courts since neither the Civil Aeronautics Act nor the Board's regu-
lations expressly required such inclusion. The want of express pro-
hibition was apparently tortured to connote invitation. Consequently,
both passengers and lawyers, ignorant of the provisions contained in
the tariffs, yet bound by them, were effectively prevented from en-
forcing legitimate claims.
It should be noted, however, that the new regulation does not
prohibit the use of these time provisions; it only proscribes them when
they are sought to be rendered operative by including them in the
carrier's tariff. Consequently, an air carrier may still contract with
passengers regarding such provisions. This may be done by express-
ing such clauses, in full, on the transportation ticket itself. Thus, if
they are printed on the face of the ticket, and are reasonable, time
provisions will bind the passenger irrespective of his actual knowledge
thereof. In such instances, it may be said that the carrier will have
:'For example: No action may be maintained for injury to, or death of,
a passenger, unless notice of claim in writing is presented to the general office
of the carrier within ninety days following the occurrence of the event giving
rise thereto, and unless the action is actually commenced within one year after
such occurrence.
2 CAB EcoNomic REGULATiONs § 221.4(g) (1954).
3 See CAB Regulation No. 195, p. 4 (1954).
4 See Note, 28 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 94 (1953).
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fairly contracted with the passenger, since he will at least have an op-
portunity to notice it. The difficulty remains, however, that most
passengers are unaware of the binding contractual conditions printed
on the transportation ticket.
In the realm of the international air carrier, over which the rules
of the Warsaw Convention may govern, the amendment will have a
similar effect. Such a carrier may still effectively include time pro-
visions on the face of the transportation ticket, but not in its filed
tariff.
Although aviation law is still in its infancy, struggling for rec-
ognition in the legal world, it is, through the process of trial and error,
gradually achieving stability. The amendment under consideration is
another cautious step toward the attainment of that end.
THE REACQUISITION OF SHARES UNDER THE NEw YORIC
STOCK CoRPoRATIoN LAW
Introduction
The manner in which a corporation may deal with its own re-
acquired shares has been a controversial problem for many years. To
properly preface a discussion of this subject, it will be necessary to
enumerate and explain some of the methods of, and the reasons for,
corporate reacquisition of both common and preferred shares.
One method of reacquisition is by corporate purchase of its own
shares from surplus or capital. While it is well settled by decisional
law in New York that a corporation may repurchase its own shares
of stock from surplus,' several states recognize this right by express
statutory provisions.2 Such regulatory provisions were enacted, not
because of a corporation's lack of inherent power to repurchase its
own shares, but rather to safeguard corporate creditors against a pos-
sible depletion of assets.3 In addition, many states,4 including New
York,5 also permit the purchase of preferred or special shares from
I See notes 23, 24 infra.
2 See statutes collected in PRASHKEm, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPO-
RATiorxs 282-283 (2d ed. 1949). See also Aiu. STAT. § 64-603 (1947); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 243 (1953) ; LA. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 23 (1950) ; W. VA.
CODE ANN. §3052 (1949).
3 See BALLANTiNE, CoRpPOAToNs 605 (Rev. ed. 1946).
4 DE_. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 243 (1953); MicH. ComP. LAws § 450.37 (1948);
Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 351.200 (1949); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-153 (1943); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 3052 (1949).
5N.Y. STocx CORP. LAvW § 28(1). The preferred shares must be re-
1954]
